Firebase Security Vulnerability: FBR-ACCESS-002¶
Name: Implicit Allow Due to Lack of Default Deny
Applicable Services: Cloud Firestore, Firebase Realtime Database, Cloud Storage
Description¶
Note
This configuration weakness occurs when a security ruleset does not end with an explicit, catch-all deny
rule. It relies on the default "implicit deny" behavior, which is a less secure and less maintainable practice.
- The Technical Flaw: The ruleset defines
allow
rules for specific paths but omits a finalmatch /{document=**} { allow read, write: if false; }
. - Intended Behavior: A robust security posture follows the principle of "default deny." Every path in your database should be explicitly denied access unless a specific rule explicitly grants it.
- The Risk: While Firebase denies access by default if no rule allows it, relying on this is risky. During development, a new data path might be added to the application without a corresponding security rule. Without an explicit global deny, it's easier to overlook this and assume the data is protected when it might fall under a broader, more permissive rule higher up in the ruleset. An explicit deny makes the security posture unambiguous.
Impact¶
Potential Consequences
The severity of this vulnerability is a note. While it doesn't create a direct flaw, it represents a poor security practice that increases the risk of future vulnerabilities: * Accidental Data Exposure: A developer might add a new collection and forget to secure it. Without an explicit deny-all, if any other rule accidentally matches that path, it could become exposed. * Reduced Maintainability: The security posture is not immediately obvious. A developer must mentally parse all rules to know what is and isn't allowed, rather than seeing a clear default-deny foundation.
Example Attack Scenarios¶
Exploit Scenario: Accidental Exposure of a New Collection
- The Vulnerable Rule: The ruleset secures the
users
andposts
collections but lacks a final deny-all rule. - Attacker's Goal: This is a scenario of accidental misconfiguration. A developer adds a new feature that stores sensitive logs in a collection called
admin_logs
. They forget to add a security rule for this new collection. - The Exploit: There is no specific exploit code. The vulnerability is the configuration state. An attacker or any authenticated user could now attempt to access this new collection.
- Outcome: In the best case, the implicit deny works, and access is denied. However, the security posture is fragile. If a developer had added a broad rule like
allow read: if request.auth != null;
to a parent path, theadmin_logs
could become readable by any user. An explicit deny-all prevents this ambiguity.
Mitigation¶
The vulnerability is resolved by adding a comprehensive, explicit deny-all
rule at the end of your ruleset. This ensures that any path not explicitly granted access by a prior rule is definitively denied.
// SECURE: Explicitly denies access to all paths by default.
service cloud.firestore {
match /databases/{database}/documents {
match /users/{userId} {
allow read, write: if request.auth.uid == userId;
}
// This rule ensures any path not matched above is denied.
match /{document=**} {
allow read, write: if false;
}
}
}
Best Practice
Always structure your rules with a "default deny" mindset. Start with the most specific rules first and end with the broadest (the deny-all). This makes your ruleset easier to read, maintain, and reason about.